VPN blocking in Myanmar since 2024-05-30 reportedly implemented by a Chinese company, Geedge Networks

[wkrp]

Since 2024-05-30 there is new blocking of VPNs in (parts of?) Myanmar. People have been using VPNs in Myanmar commonly since 2021 to circumvent blocks of Facebook and other sites.

What I find interesting about the news article is it says that the military government worked with an unspecified Chinese company to implement these new blocks.

https://yktnews.com/2024/05/165124/ (archive)

မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းတွင် VPN များ ချိတ်ဆက်မရတော့ဘဲ လူမှုကွန်ရက် Facebook စာမျက်နှာနှင့် မက်ဆင်ဂျာများ သုံးစွဲမရ ဖြစ်နေ

ရန်ကုန်၊ မေ ၃၀

မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းတွင် VPN များ ချိတ်ဆက်မရတော့ဘဲ လူမှုကွန်ရက် Facebook စာမျက်နှာနှင့် မက်ဆင်ဂျာများ သုံးစွဲမရ ဖြစ်နေကြောင်း ရန်ကုန်မနှင့် မန္တလေးမှ ပြည်သူများက ရန်ကုန်ခေတ်သစ်သတင်းဌာနထံသို့ ပြောဆိုကြသည်။

“ဒီမနက်က စပြီး VPN တွေချိတ်မရဘူး။ ပုံမှန်သုံးနေတဲ့ VPN ကို ချိတ်မရတာ။ Wifi ပေးတဲ့ ကုမ္ပဏီကို ဆက်တော့ အခြား VPN တစ်ခု သုံးခိုင်းတယ်။ ချိတ်လို့ရပေမယ့် Facebook ဖွင့်တာ ဘာမှ ကြည့်မရဘူး။ ဓာတ်ပုံရော စာသားရော မပေါ်တာ။ မက်ဆင်ဂျာကလည်း စာပဲ ရိုက်လို့ရတယ်။ ဖုန်းပြောမရဘူး” ဟု မရမ်းကုန်းမနယ်မှ ပြည်သူတစ်ဦးက ပြောဆိုသည်။

ရန်ကုန်ခေတ်သစ်သတင်းဌာနက ရန်ကုန်အခြေစိုက် အင်တာနက်ဖိုက်ဘာလိုင်းဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးသော ကုမ္ပဏီတစ်ခုကို ဆက်သွယ်မေးမြန်းရာ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံမှ ဆော့ဝဲများဖြင့် VPN များ အသုံးပြုမရစေရန် လုပ်ဆောင် ပိတ် ဆို့ထားသည်ဆိုသော သတင်းများသိရှိထားကြောင်း၊ ယခု ပြည်သူများ အကျွမ်းတဝင် အသုံးပြုနေသော VPN များ သုံးမရဖြစ်နေသည်ဆိုသော ဖုန်းဆက်မေးမြန်းမှုများ ယနေ့ နံနက်ပိုင်းနှင့် မွန်းလွဲပိုင်းတွင် အလွန်များပြားကြောင်း ပြောဆိုသည်။

မြန်မာ့ဆက်သွယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းနှင့်နီးစပ်သော သတင်းရင်းမြစ်တစ်ခုကမူ ယခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှစတင်ပြီး တရုတ်နိုင်ငံမှ ကုမ္ပဏီတစ်ခုထံသို့ စစ်ကောင်စီက VPN များကို ပိတ်ပင်နိုင်သည့် Great Firewall တစ်ခု တည်ဆောက်ရန် တင်ဒါပေးလိုက်ကြောင်း၊ ယင်းတရုတ်ကုမ္ပဏီက နေပြည်တော်နှင့်ရန်ကုန်တွင် အခြေ စိုက်ပြီး Great Firewall များ တည်ဆောက်နေသည်ဆိုသော သတင်းများ ကြားသိထားကြောင်း ရန်ကုန်ခေတ်သစ်သတင်းဌာနထံသို့ ယခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၁၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြောဆိုခဲ့သည်။

“တရုတ်လို Great Firewall တွေ လုပ်မယ်လို့ သတင်းတွေ ထွက်နေတာကြာပြီ။ အတိအကျတော့ ဘယ်တရုတ်ကုမ္ပဏီလဲဆိုတာ မသိရဘူး” ဟု မြန်မာ့ဆက်သွယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းနှင့်နီးစပ်သော သတင်းရင်းမြစ်က ယခုနှစ် မတ်လ ၁၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြောဆိုခဲ့သည်။

စစ်ကောင်စီက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖေ့ဘုတ်စ် Facebook လူမှုကွန်ရက်အသုံးပြုမှုများကို တရားဝင်ပိတ်ပင်လိုက်သဖြင့် ပြည်သူများမှာ VPN အသုံးပြု၍ Facebook လူမှုကွန်ရက်ကို သုံးစွဲနေကြရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

In Myanmar, VPNs are no longer connected, and Facebook pages and messengers cannot be used

Yangon, May 30

Residents of Yangon and Mandalay told the Yangon Modern News Agency that they are no longer able to connect to VPNs in Myanmar and cannot access Facebook pages and messengers.

“Starting this morning, I can't connect to VPNs. I can't connect to my regular VPN. I asked the wifi company to use another VPN. I can connect, but I can't see anything when I open Facebook. Neither the photo nor the text appears. Messenger can also type. I can't talk on the phone," said a resident of Mayangone Township.

Yangon New Age News contacted a Yangon-based internet fiber line service company, and they learned that they have been blocked by software from China to prevent the use of VPNs. It is said that there are a lot of phone calls today morning and afternoon saying that the VPNs that people are familiar with are not working.

A source close to Myanmar's telecommunications industry said that since February of this year, the Military Council has awarded a tender to a Chinese company to build a Great Firewall that can block VPNs. On March 14 of this year, he told Yangon New Times that he had heard news that the Chinese company was building Great Firewalls based in Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon.

"There have been reports for a long time that China will build a Great Firewall. We don't know exactly which Chinese company it is," a source close to Myanmar's telecommunications industry said on March 14 this year.

After the military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, the military council officially banned the use of Facebook social network in Myanmar, so people have to use a VPN to use the Facebook social network.

I found this out from an issue on the Tor bug tracker. There you can see there has been a great increase in bridge users since 2024-05-30.

[systemhorse]

Reddit users report blocking in Myanmar and possible solutions:

https://old.reddit.com/r/dumbclub/comments/1d64bh4/howdy/

[wkrp]

Citing leaked planning documents, Justice for Myanmar claims that the Chinese company implementing VPN blocks is Geedge Networks (Chinese name 积至（海南）信息技术有限公司), a firewall company in Beijing. Justice for Myanmar's report names specific products of Geedge Networks.

2024-06-19: The Myanmar junta’s partners in digital surveillance and censorship (archive)

At the end of May 2024, the junta began using a new web surveillance and censorship system to increase its control of the internet. Leaked documents seen by Justice For Myanmar indicate that the system has capabilities to intercept and decrypt web traffic and block applications and websites, including the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs), which are commonly used to bypass junta censorship and surveillance. It can also monitor an individual's use of network applications communicating over the internet, including VPNs, which could be used for further arbitrary arrests.

Planning documents indicate that the system uses network hardware (a secure web gateway) with deep packet inspection for internet surveillance and censorship at internet service providers (including mobile network operators) and internet gateways. Deep packet inspection is a way of processing data that captures, decodes and analyses packets of data, which could include the content of messages and emails and the details of a user’s internet traffic.

According to the planning documents, the new system uses Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG) (archive) and Cyber Narrator (archive) from Jizhi (Hainan) Information Technology Company Limited, also known as Geedge Networks, a Chinese private network security and intelligence equipment and solutions company.

Geedge Networks was set up in 2018. It is based in the Hainan Free Trade Port with a research and development office in Beijing. One of the company’s founders and chief scientist is Fang Binxing, the “father” of China’s Great Firewall. It is owned by two holding companies: Dongguan Hulian Network Security Investment Partnership (Limited Partnership) and Nali (Chengmai) Information Consulting Center (Limited Partnership), according to records from the company database Orbis. Geedge Networks’ operating revenue has steadily increased from US$11.1 million in 2018 to US$18.5 million in 2021. The company has associated itself with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, of which Myanmar is a participating country.

Geedge Networks’ claims (archive) its members come from the Chinese Academy of Science with extensive experience in deep packet inspection, big data and artificial intelligence.

The report says there are Chinese technicians working on the firewall hardware in Myanmar, though they could not determine if the technicians are employees of Geedge Networks.

The report also mentions a location tracking project being implemented by the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC).

Thanks to @gusgustavo for bringing this to my attention with comments on the Tor bug tracker. There is other reporting on the Justice for Myanmar report at Radio Free Asia (archive) and Access Now (archive).

[Gowee]

The former name of Geedge Networks in Chinese is 中电积至(海南) 信息技术有限公司 of which the leading word 中电 is possibly short for the China Electronics (Corporation), who owns the CEIEC.

[wkrp]

We have not specifically talked about Geedge Networks on this forum before, but believe it or not, we have discussed research publications written by people who are affiliated with Geedge Networks. (Or who would go on to become affiliated; the publications are from 2018, the same year Geedge was founded.) Besides 方滨兴 (Fang Binxing), there is also 郑超 (Zheng Chao), who coauthored the following publications we have discussed:

• Understanding the Network Traffic Constraints for Deep Packet Inspection by Passive Measurement (ICISE 2018)
• A Flexible and Efficient Container-based NFV Platform for Middlebox Networking (SAC 2018)

Zheng's affiliation on these publication is "Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences". This is consistent with the statement on Geedge Networks' "About" page: "Team members come from the Chinese Academic of Science".

https://people.ucas.edu.cn/self/img/2605b94a-9508-4f26-8b0a-fb172aecb846.jpg

At one time, Zheng had an academic webpage at the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences website, but now it is 404 and I do not know of an archived version. [EDIT 2025-01-23: The page is back online.]

• https://people.ucas.edu.cn/~zhengchao
• https://web.archive.org/web/20240627170907/https://people.ucas.edu.cn/~zhengchao

Zheng's IEEE and ACM profiles have further publications, most of which are relevant to the topic of network filtering:

• https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/author/37085413301
  • Detecting Fake-Normal Pornographic and Gambling Websites through one Multi-Attention HGNN (CSCWD 2023)
  • A Lightweight Graph-based Method to Detect Pornographic and Gambling Websites with Imperfect Datasets (TrustCom 2022)
  • CDNFinder: Detecting CDN-hosted Nodes by Graph-Based Semi-Supervised Classification (ISCC 2021)
  • A P4-Based Packet Scheduling Approach for Clustered Deep Packet Inspection Appliances (ICCCN 2021)
  • DOOM: a Training-Free, Real-Time Video Flow Identification Method for Encrypted Traffic (ICT 2020)
  • Tensor: A Transaction-Oriented Low-Latency and Reliable Data Distribution Scheme for Multi-IDCs Based on Redis (HPCC 2019)
  • Understanding the Network Traffic Constraints for Deep Packet Inspection by Passive Measurement (ICISE 2018) (Understanding the Network Traffic Constraints for Deep Packet Inspection by Passive Measurement (ICISE 2018) #275)
  • Janus: A User-Level TCP Stack for Processing 40 Million Concurrent TCP Connections (ICC 2018)
  • Evaluating routing asymmetry by passive flow measurements with spark (ICCCBDA 2018) (Understanding the Network Traffic Constraints for Deep Packet Inspection by Passive Measurement (ICISE 2018) #275 (comment))
  • Understanding usage behaviors of mobile apps by identifying app package in network traffic (ICCSN 2017)
  • AppTwins: A new approach to identify app package in network traffic (ICICS 2017)
  • Taking over malicious connection in half way by migrating protocol state to a user-level TCP stack (ICICS 2017)
  • CookieMiner: Towards real-time reconstruction of web-downloading chains from network traces (ICC 2016)
  • Limited Dictionary Builder: An approach to select representative tokens for malicious URLs detection (ICC 2015)
  • GuidedTracker: Track the victims with access logs to finding malicious web pages (GlobeCom 2014)
• https://dl.acm.org/profile/99659280832
  • A flexible and efficient container-based NFV platform for middlebox networking (SAC 2018) (A Flexible and Efficient Container-based NFV Platform for Middlebox Networking (ACM SAC 2018) #282)

[wkrp]

According to this January 2024 article (archive) about the establishment of a "Fang Binxing workstation" in Hainan province, the CEO of Geedge Networks is 王媛娣 (Wang Yuandi).

揭牌仪式现场，积至（海南）信息技术有限公司CEO兼院士工作站负责人王媛娣主持会议并就工作站的建站情况进行介绍。

At the unveiling ceremony, Wang Yuandi, CEO of Geedge Networks and person in charge of the academic workstation, presided over the meeting and made a presentation on the establishment of the workstation.

Wang Yuandi's name appears on this company registration info page (archive).

Searching Google Patents, Wang Yuandi is named as an inventor on a number of patents assigned to Geedge Networks. Some examples:

• CN112148430 一种虚拟网络功能的虚拟机在线安全迁移的方法
  Method for online safe migration of virtual machine with virtual network function
  张微 (Zhang Wei), 郑超 (Zheng Chao), 卢文朋 (Lu Wenming), 王媛娣 (Wang Yuandi), 黄园园 (Huang Yuanyuan)
• CN112583810
  一种基于上下文的虚拟网络零信任方法
  Zero trust method for context-based virtual network
  张微 (Zhang Wei), 郑超 (Zheng Chao), 卢文朋 (Lu Wenming), 王媛娣 (Wang Yuandi), 黄园园 (Huang Yuanyuan)
• CN112990286
  一种数据不平衡场景下的恶意流量检测方法
  Malicious traffic detection method in data imbalance scene
  戚岱杰 (Qi Daijie), 窦凤虎 (Dou Fenghu), 郑超 (Zheng Chao), 王媛娣 (Wang Yuandi)
• CN112966261
  一种轻量级可拓展的网络流量特征提取工具和方法
  Lightweight scalable network traffic feature extraction tool and method
  张微 (Zhang Wei), 雷军 (Lei Jun), 牛翔 (Niu Xiang), 王媛娣 (Wang Yuandi)

[fortuna]

Thanks for the information. Very concerning to see other countries using Chinese technology for censorship.

I can report that Outline was partially affected. These are opt-in metrics from servers:

You can see a initial drop on May 30, 2024, then a bigger one on June 12. Traffic mostly recovered, and is now around 80% of what was before the blocks. I imagine changing servers or using prefixes help.

Keep in mind that opt-in metrics may be biased.

This is the number of unique servers reporting metrics that serve users in Myanmar:

You can see an increase following the blocks, which indicates lots of new deployments. It also indicates that the drops in traffic are not due to servers being shut down.

[wkrp]

On 2025-05-21, Finance Uncovered and Myanmar Now published a report about the installation of Geedge Networks equipments in Myanmar (archive). Citing new documents, the report names a specific ISP, Frontiir.

An investigation by Finance Uncovered (FU) and Myanmar Now (MN) has collected evidence from multiple sources indicating that Frontiir has installed equipment capable of tracking people online, blocking websites and preventing people from using virtual private networks (VPNs) which allow users to side-step censorship controls.

The equipment was developed by Geedge Networks, a controversial Chinese cybersecurity company founded by the so-called father of China's Great Firewall, Fang Binxing.

Information obtained by FU and MN shows that Geedge equipment is seemingly housed inside one of Frontiir's data centres in Yangon, Myanmar's biggest city. It appears to be the same technology that featured in a separate investigation by activist group Justice For Myanmar (JFM) in June 2024.

The report corroborates last year's report from Justice for Myanmar, saying that the hardward installed is the Geedge Networks Tiangou Secure Gateway. The installation enables censorship and surveillance not only of Frontiir / Myanmar Net, but of all ISPs in Myanmar.

Last year, a JFM investigation obtained leaks which suggested that Geedge's Tiangou secure gateway (TSG) sits at the heart of the Myanmar junta's newly upgraded surveillance system.

New information provided to FU by well-placed sources suggests that Frontiir hosts the same TSG technology in its own data centre in east Yangon. This has the potential to allow the junta's cybersurveillance team to remotely monitor web traffic and "intercept most things," according to one source.

Digital rights activists claim that the junta has rolled out technology allowing its cyber security team to remotely monitor web traffic not just at Frontiir's Myanmar Net, but all telecommunications companies and ISPs in Myanmar.

Even before Geedge Networks involvement, as far back as 2020, Frontiir has implemented Internet shutdowns, web site blocking, and social media blocking:

Concerns about Frontiir's compliance with the Myanmar government's demands to censor the internet were voiced in 2020, when FU and MN reported that it was blocking access to thousands of websites on the Myanmar government's orders.

Frontiir shut off the internet in the commercial hubs of Yangon, Mandalay and the capital Naypyidaw on the military's orders on the day of the coup. Since then, it has periodically blocked social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter (now X) and Instagram, as well as independent media and civil society sites.

Frontiir (or its parent company) has received critical funding from European state investors:

FU and MN's findings are likely to present a quandary for the governments of the UK, Norway and Denmark, all of which own shares in Frontiir. Their funding has been crucial in driving its rapid growth to become one of the largest ISPs in Myanmar, providing internet services to millions of people through its Myanmar Net brand.

The UK's development fund, British International Investments (BII), has invested $26 million into Frontiir's Singapore parent company. Norfund also invested 26.9 million Norwegian krone ($3 million) and Denmark’s IFU spent 70.1 million Danish krone ($10.5 million) on Frontiir shares.

The UK's development fund, then known as CDC Group, pledged an urgent investigation after questions were raised in the UK parliament about Frontiir's censorship of the internet in June of [2020].

But rather than divest its $20 million stake, CDC invested a further $3 million the following month.

Frontiir was founded by three Americans, including Godfrey Tan:

Founded by three US citizens and led by Myanmar-born MIT doctorate Godfrey Tan, Frontiir's business grew swiftly after a previous military regime ceded power to a quasi-civilian administration that was succeeded in 2015 by the first elected civilian government in a generation.