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Coa teste#25

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sntooosk merged 4 commits intomainfrom
coa-teste
Nov 30, 2025
Merged

Coa teste#25
sntooosk merged 4 commits intomainfrom
coa-teste

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qa-lite-service Ready Ready Preview Comment Nov 30, 2025 11:33pm

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💡 Codex Review

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Comment on lines +3 to +5
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]

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P1 Badge Avoid running fork code with privileged pull_request_target token

Using pull_request_target here means the workflow executes with the base repo’s GITHUB_TOKEN (granted pull-requests: write), but later in the job the head SHA from the fork is checked out and npm ci/npm run lint are executed. For a malicious fork, altering package.json scripts is enough to run arbitrary code with that elevated token and exfiltrate it or rewrite PR data, which GitHub explicitly warns against for pull_request_target when checking out forked code. Consider switching to the pull_request event or avoiding checkout of untrusted head commits.

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Comment on lines +1 to +3
npx commitlint --edit $1

COMMIT_MSG_FILE="$1"

if [ -z "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE" ]; then
COMMIT_MSG_FILE=".git/COMMIT_EDITMSG"
fi

if [ -f "./node_modules/@commitlint/cli/cli.js" ]; then
node ./node_modules/@commitlint/cli/cli.js --edit "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE"
else
echo "[husky] commitlint skipped (dependency not installed)"
fi
.husky/utils/protected-branches.sh

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P1 Badge Hooks call non-executable protected-branches script

The new hooks invoke .husky/utils/protected-branches.sh, but the script is checked in with mode 100644 and is executed directly rather than sourced. On commit/push the hook will attempt to run this file and immediately fail with Permission denied (exit 126), aborting the Git operation even on allowed branches. Marking the helper as executable or sourcing it is needed for the hook to work.

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@sntooosk sntooosk merged commit dbf6e32 into main Nov 30, 2025
2 of 3 checks passed
@sntooosk sntooosk deleted the coa-teste branch November 30, 2025 23:34
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