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Reviewed commit: ad29119e25
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| let permission_profile = permission_profile_override_from_config(config); | ||
| let sandbox = permission_profile | ||
| .is_none() | ||
| .then(|| sandbox_mode_from_policy(config.permissions.sandbox_policy.get().clone())) |
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Gate permission_profile overrides for remote app-server sessions
These lines always derive permission_profile from the local Config and then suppress sandbox, even when ThreadParamsMode::Remote is in use. In remote mode we already avoid forwarding local-only values like cwd/model_provider, but config.permissions.permission_profile() is runtime-expanded with local filesystem entries, so sending it to a remote app-server can apply client-local absolute paths and miss the server-side workspace carveouts it would normally derive. This affects thread/start, thread/resume, and thread/fork because they all share this override path.
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## Why #18275 anchors session-scoped `:cwd` and `:project_roots` grants to the request cwd before recording them for reuse. Relative deny glob entries need the same treatment. Without anchoring, a stored session permission can keep a pattern such as `**/*.env` relative, then reinterpret that deny against a later turn cwd. That makes the persisted profile depend on the cwd at reuse time instead of the cwd that was reviewed and approved. ## What changed `intersect_permission_profiles` now materializes retained `FileSystemPath::GlobPattern` entries against the request cwd, matching the existing materialization for cwd-sensitive special paths. Materialized accepted grants are now deduplicated before deny retention runs. This keeps the sticky-grant preapproval shape stable when a repeated request is merged with the stored grant and both `:cwd = write` and the materialized absolute cwd write are present. The preapproval check compares against the same materialized form, so a later request for the same cwd-relative deny glob still matches the stored anchored grant instead of re-prompting or rejecting. Tests cover both the storage path and the preapproval path: a session-scoped `:cwd = write` grant with `**/*.env = none` is stored with both the cwd write and deny glob anchored to the original request cwd, cannot be reused from a later cwd, and remains preapproved when re-requested from the original cwd after merging with the stored grant. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms` - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib relative_deny_glob_grants_remain_preapproved_after_materialization` - `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --tests -- -D clippy::redundant_clone` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib -- -D clippy::redundant_clone` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18867). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * #18277 * #18276 * __->__ #18867
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## Why `Permissions` should not store a separate `PermissionProfile` that can drift from the constrained `SandboxPolicy` and network settings. The active profile needs to be derived from the same constrained values that already honor `requirements.toml`. ## What changed This adds derivation of the active `PermissionProfile` from the constrained runtime permission settings and exposes that derived value through config snapshots and thread state. The app-server can then report the active profile without introducing a second source of truth. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions -- --nocapture` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18277). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * __->__ #18277
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Why
After app-server can accept
PermissionProfile, first-party clients should stop preferring legacy sandbox fields when they have canonical permission information available. This keeps the migration moving without removing legacy compatibility yet.What changed
This updates the exec and TUI app-server clients to send
permissionProfileoverrides derived from config, while preserving legacy sandbox fallback behavior when a profile is not available.Verification
cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapturecargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages -- --nocaptureStack created with Sapling. Best reviewed with ReviewStack.