Skip to content

clients: send permission profiles to app-server#18280

Open
bolinfest wants to merge 2 commits intopr18279from
pr18280
Open

clients: send permission profiles to app-server#18280
bolinfest wants to merge 2 commits intopr18279from
pr18280

Conversation

@bolinfest
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

@bolinfest bolinfest commented Apr 17, 2026

Why

After app-server can accept PermissionProfile, first-party clients should stop preferring legacy sandbox fields when they have canonical permission information available. This keeps the migration moving without removing legacy compatibility yet.

What changed

This updates the exec and TUI app-server clients to send permissionProfile overrides derived from config, while preserving legacy sandbox fallback behavior when a profile is not available.

Verification

  • cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture
  • cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages -- --nocapture

Stack created with Sapling. Best reviewed with ReviewStack.

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

💡 Codex Review

Here are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.

Reviewed commit: ad29119e25

ℹ️ About Codex in GitHub

Your team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you

  • Open a pull request for review
  • Mark a draft as ready
  • Comment "@codex review".

If Codex has suggestions, it will comment; otherwise it will react with 👍.

Codex can also answer questions or update the PR. Try commenting "@codex address that feedback".

Comment on lines +930 to +933
let permission_profile = permission_profile_override_from_config(config);
let sandbox = permission_profile
.is_none()
.then(|| sandbox_mode_from_policy(config.permissions.sandbox_policy.get().clone()))
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Gate permission_profile overrides for remote app-server sessions

These lines always derive permission_profile from the local Config and then suppress sandbox, even when ThreadParamsMode::Remote is in use. In remote mode we already avoid forwarding local-only values like cwd/model_provider, but config.permissions.permission_profile() is runtime-expanded with local filesystem entries, so sending it to a remote app-server can apply client-local absolute paths and miss the server-side workspace carveouts it would normally derive. This affects thread/start, thread/resume, and thread/fork because they all share this override path.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

@bolinfest bolinfest force-pushed the pr18280 branch 2 times, most recently from ab0e270 to c013a96 Compare April 21, 2026 16:19
@bolinfest bolinfest force-pushed the pr18279 branch 2 times, most recently from 0d7a36c to c897233 Compare April 21, 2026 17:27
bolinfest added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2026
## Why

#18275 anchors session-scoped `:cwd` and `:project_roots` grants to the
request cwd before recording them for reuse. Relative deny glob entries
need the same treatment. Without anchoring, a stored session permission
can keep a pattern such as `**/*.env` relative, then reinterpret that
deny against a later turn cwd. That makes the persisted profile depend
on the cwd at reuse time instead of the cwd that was reviewed and
approved.

## What changed

`intersect_permission_profiles` now materializes retained
`FileSystemPath::GlobPattern` entries against the request cwd, matching
the existing materialization for cwd-sensitive special paths.

Materialized accepted grants are now deduplicated before deny retention
runs. This keeps the sticky-grant preapproval shape stable when a
repeated request is merged with the stored grant and both `:cwd = write`
and the materialized absolute cwd write are present.

The preapproval check compares against the same materialized form, so a
later request for the same cwd-relative deny glob still matches the
stored anchored grant instead of re-prompting or rejecting.

Tests cover both the storage path and the preapproval path: a
session-scoped `:cwd = write` grant with `**/*.env = none` is stored
with both the cwd write and deny glob anchored to the original request
cwd, cannot be reused from a later cwd, and remains preapproved when
re-requested from the original cwd after merging with the stored grant.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib
relative_deny_glob_grants_remain_preapproved_after_materialization`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --tests -- -D
clippy::redundant_clone`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib -- -D clippy::redundant_clone`

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18867).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* #18279
* #18278
* #18277
* #18276
* __->__ #18867
@bolinfest bolinfest force-pushed the pr18279 branch 2 times, most recently from 2b145dd to 9048348 Compare April 22, 2026 03:23
bolinfest added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2026
## Why

`Permissions` should not store a separate `PermissionProfile` that can
drift from the constrained `SandboxPolicy` and network settings. The
active profile needs to be derived from the same constrained values that
already honor `requirements.toml`.

## What changed

This adds derivation of the active `PermissionProfile` from the
constrained runtime permission settings and exposes that derived value
through config snapshots and thread state. The app-server can then
report the active profile without introducing a second source of truth.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages --
--nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions --
--nocapture`



























---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18277).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* #18279
* #18278
* __->__ #18277
@bolinfest bolinfest requested a review from a team as a code owner April 22, 2026 06:34
@bolinfest bolinfest force-pushed the pr18279 branch 3 times, most recently from 89a0761 to d29fd8d Compare April 22, 2026 07:09
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

1 participant