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| permission_profile: PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions( | ||
| file_system_sandbox_policy, | ||
| network_sandbox_policy, | ||
| ), |
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Converting the rerun policy through PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(...) drops the filesystem kind, so an ExternalSandbox policy is serialized as a generic root-write profile and later reconstructed as Restricted in prepare_escalated_exec (to_runtime_permissions). In the ExternalSandbox + network restricted case, this changes select_initial behavior from no extra sandbox to requiring a platform sandbox, so intercepted child processes can be unexpectedly re-sandboxed/denied after approval. Previously this path carried the concrete runtime policies directly and preserved ExternalSandbox semantics.
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## Why #18275 anchors session-scoped `:cwd` and `:project_roots` grants to the request cwd before recording them for reuse. Relative deny glob entries need the same treatment. Without anchoring, a stored session permission can keep a pattern such as `**/*.env` relative, then reinterpret that deny against a later turn cwd. That makes the persisted profile depend on the cwd at reuse time instead of the cwd that was reviewed and approved. ## What changed `intersect_permission_profiles` now materializes retained `FileSystemPath::GlobPattern` entries against the request cwd, matching the existing materialization for cwd-sensitive special paths. Materialized accepted grants are now deduplicated before deny retention runs. This keeps the sticky-grant preapproval shape stable when a repeated request is merged with the stored grant and both `:cwd = write` and the materialized absolute cwd write are present. The preapproval check compares against the same materialized form, so a later request for the same cwd-relative deny glob still matches the stored anchored grant instead of re-prompting or rejecting. Tests cover both the storage path and the preapproval path: a session-scoped `:cwd = write` grant with `**/*.env = none` is stored with both the cwd write and deny glob anchored to the original request cwd, cannot be reused from a later cwd, and remains preapproved when re-requested from the original cwd after merging with the stored grant. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms` - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib relative_deny_glob_grants_remain_preapproved_after_materialization` - `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --tests -- -D clippy::redundant_clone` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --lib -- -D clippy::redundant_clone` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18867). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * #18277 * #18276 * __->__ #18867
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## Why `Permissions` should not store a separate `PermissionProfile` that can drift from the constrained `SandboxPolicy` and network settings. The active profile needs to be derived from the same constrained values that already honor `requirements.toml`. ## What changed This adds derivation of the active `PermissionProfile` from the constrained runtime permission settings and exposes that derived value through config snapshots and thread state. The app-server can then report the active profile without introducing a second source of truth. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all permissions_messages -- --nocapture` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions -- --nocapture` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18277). * #18288 * #18287 * #18286 * #18285 * #18284 * #18283 * #18282 * #18281 * #18280 * #18279 * #18278 * __->__ #18277
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Why
Shell escalation still has adapter code that expects a legacy sandbox policy, but command approvals should carry the resolved
PermissionProfileso callers can reason about the granted permissions canonically.What changed
This introduces profile-shaped resolved escalation permissions while retaining the derived legacy sandbox policy for the Unix escalation adapter. It updates approval types, the escalation server protocol, and tests that inspect escalated command permissions.
Verification
cargo test -p codex-core --test all handle_container_exec_ -- --nocapturecargo test -p codex-core --test all handle_sandbox_ -- --nocaptureStack created with Sapling. Best reviewed with ReviewStack.